Encrypting information with pre-agreed key is an effective method to ensure information security. With the increasing requirement for key rate, this paper investigates the problem of simultaneously generating a secret key (SK) and a private key (PK) over three legitimate terminals with a trusted helper via public discussion that a passive eavesdropper completely access to. The legitimate terminals and the helper observe the correlated source sequences from the outputs of discrete memoryless source (DMS). The legitimate terminals wish to generate an SK that is concealed from the eavesdropper, and two designated legitimate terminals want to generate a PK that needs to be additionally keep secret from the third legitimate terminal. Under this model, the SK-PK capacity region is fully characterized, and the source coding scheme is further provided to show that the region is achievable. The security performance of the generated keys is analyzed in terms of key leakage rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of mobile communication and the pre-commercial trial of the fifth generation (5G) wireless communication, massive connectivity of devices is requested to support the new scenarios, including Internet of Things (IoT), Device-to-Device (D2D) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) [1] - [3] . The confidentiality of information is requested for even higher requirements, and the security issues in different networks have received extensive attention [4] - [9] . Cryptography, providing many algorithms and protocols to meet practical demands, is the theoretical foundation and core technology of information security [10] . The reliability and security of classical cryptographic algorithms depend on the complexity of solving mathematical formulas and the computational capabilities of eavesdroppers, which will be limited by the hardware conditions of the terminals. By increasing computational capabilities of eavesdroppers, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chunsheng Zhu . the information-theoretic security technologies can ensure the unconditional security and are not subject to the above limitations [11] .
The pioneering work, which studied cryptography from information theory perspective, by Shannon showed that the legitimate terminals can ensure secure communication using a secret key (SK) shared between them with nothing about that leaking to eavesdropper [12] . The SKs need to be generated first when no SK is available. As the basic model of key generation, the discrete memoryless source (DMS) model has been widely studied. In the DMS model, terminals observe the correlated sources from given DMS, and they can agree SKs using these source observations through a public channel with or without rate constraint [13] , [14] . The generated SKs need to keep secret from eavesdroppers.
A. RELATED WORKS
Multiple types of DMS models have been widely studied in the field of SK-generation [13] - [28] . The SK-generation over two terminals was first investigated by Ahlswede and VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Csisàr utilizing correlated source observations and public discussion [13] , and the SK-capacity of the considered model was also provided. The key generation for multiple terminals (more than two terminals) was studied in [14] - [16] , which concerned about single SK capacity regions and algorithms.
With the improvement of security requirements, multiple keys are required to be generated [18] - [27] , [29] - [31] . The problem of multi-key generation was first developed in [18] , in which the purpose was to characterize the key capacity region of two private keys (PK) generated by two different pairs of three terminals simultaneously, when the two PKs need to keep confidential with each other. [19] considered a similar model to [18] , except that one of the two keys needs not to be concealed from the remaining terminal. On the other hand, [21] , [23] and [26] introduced helpers to improve the key rate for multi-key generation. [23] considered the problem of generating two keys simultaneously over two legitimate users with two relays, where one key is required to be secure from eavesdropper and the other needs to be confidential from both eavesdropper and relays. [26] mainly focused on simultaneously generating two keys over a cellular source model with a helper. In the considered cellular model, two users aimed to generate a key with a base station (BS), respectively, with an external user as the helper, and in view of different security requirements for the two keys, four types of models were considered. The achievable key capacity region of each model was provided. Furthermore, the problem of generating more than two keys with the BS over multi-user was also developed in [26] , and the question with similar flavor was already asked in [21] for the pairwise independent network (PIN) model, where the source observations between each pair of terminals are mutual independent [15] , [17] , [22] . The literatures mentioned above all considered generating pairwise keys, which means each key will be generated by two different terminals. Unlike them, [24] and [25] focused on the SK-PK capacity for the three-terminal model. For the considered model, the three terminals wish to share an SK that needs to keep secret from an eavesdropper, and simultaneously, two designated terminals wish to generate a PK that needs to be additionally concealed from the third terminal. The inner bound and outer bound on the SK-PK capacity region were provided in [24] , and the outer bound can be intuitively understood as cut-set bounds. There are three cases of the outer bound for different source distributions, and one of them is already proved that the inner bound matches the outer bound in [24] , while the other two cases were still open problems. These problems were solved in [25] via designing novel random binning-joint decoding schemes [32] that can make the inner bound coincided the outer bound for the remaining cases.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
Based on the above observations, with the understanding that key generation with cooperative terminals can improve the key rate effectively [15] , [33] - [35] , it is thus of interest to investigate whether it is possible to simultaneously generating SK and PK over three terminals with a trusted helper. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been considered so far since there are more partitions of source components than that for three-terminal system by introducing a trusted helper, which yields more cases of key capacity region due to different source distributions, and it is still a challenge to design the achievable scheme for all cases.
Motivated by this, this paper aims to study how to generate SK and PK simultaneously over three legitimate terminals with an additional terminal as a trusted helper, via the public channel without the rate constraint, in the presence of an eavesdropper who can listen to the public discussion. The SK needs to be concealed from the eavesdropper, while the PK needs to be additionally protected from the third legitimate terminal.
The considered model can be better illustrated by some practical scenarios. For instance, a social-aware D2D network is comprise of a three-user D2D cluster, who want to exchange information with each other. There might be a friendly relay (trusted helper) and an unknown user (eavesdropper), who might overhear the D2D transmissions. In the D2D cluster, the exchanged information over a pair of users might be private, and in this case, the remaining user can be viewed as an eavesdropper. See more scenarios about socialaware D2D communications in [36] , [37] and the references therein.
The main contributions of this paper include:
• For the considered four-terminal (three legitimate terminals and a trusted helper) DMS model, the SK-PK capacity region is characterized, including single key capacity regions (SK-capacity region and PK-capacity region) and sum key capacity region. These regions can be regarded as cut-set bounds.
• The converse proof and achievability proof are provided. More concretely, in converse proof, the SK-PK capacity region is described intuitively using the cut-set theory, and the appendix gives a strict mathematical deduction process. In the achievability proof, the achievable scheme that can achieve the region is designed based on double random binning and joint typicality [32] . The binning rate settings of the achievable scheme need to satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions to ensure the decoding error is arbitrary small.
• To analyze the security performance of the two generated keys, the key leakage rates are analyzed, including the sufficient conditions to be met for the binning rates.
C. ORGANIZATION AND NOTATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III provides the SK-PK capacity region of the model considered and the corresponding achievability proof is given in Section IV. The conclusion remarks of this paper are given in Section V. The notations used in this paper are shown in Table 1 . 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1 . The DMS has four components corresponding to generic RVs X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 with alphabets X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 . The considered model contains three legitimate terminals (Terminals 1, 2 and 3) with an additional terminal (Terminal 4) as a trusted helper, and the four terminals utilize the noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity to exchange messages. A passive eavesdropper Eve has complete access to the noiseless public channel, who does not have correlated source observations and eavesdrops information from the public discussion only. Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 4 observe n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the RVs X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 from the source outputs of the DMS, respectively, i.e., X n i = {X i1 , . . . , X in } for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The joint probability mass function (pmf) is given by
Following the previous literatures [16] , [25] , [26] , without loss of generality, this paper makes assumption that the information transmissions in public channel occur in 4r time slots with r rounds over four terminals. The total transmissions is expressed as l = (l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l 4r ), and l t is the transmission in time slot t by Terminal m where 1 ≤ t ≤ 4r and m ≡ t mod 4. Each l t is determined by its own source observations and the previous public transmissions, and l t can be depicted by l t = [X n t , l (1,t−1) ] with l (1,t−1) = (l 1 , . . . , l t−1 ). As in Fig. 1 , Terminals 1, 2 and 3 wish to generate an SK K S with Terminal 4 as a trusted helper utilizing the correlated source observations, and simultaneously, two pre-specified terminals (Terminals 1 and 2) want to generate a PK K P with Terminal 3 as a non-trusted helper and Terminal 4 as a trusted helper. The two expected keys have different security clearance levels, i.e., K S just needs to be concealed from Eve while K P needs to be protected from Eve as well as from Terminal 3.
According to [16] and [24] , for a given arbitrarily small value > 0 and some functions f (V ) for RV V , another RV U is described as -recoverable from V when it satisfies
Denote by R S the key rate of K S , and denote by R P the key rate of K P . The mathematical conditions that the key pair (K S , K P ) and the corresponding key rate pair (R S , R P ) should satisfy are shown in the following definitions.
Definition 1: The key pair (K S , K P ) is described as an −(SK-PK) for every > 0 and sufficiently large n when the following conditions are satisfied [24] - [26] , [38] .
• K S is -recoverable from (l, X n 1 ), (l, X n 2 ) and (l, X n 3 ), while K P is -recoverable from (l, X n 1 ) and (l, X n 2 ). • K S and K P satisfy the secrecy conditions 1 n I (K S ; l) < ,
where (1) denotes that K S needs to keep secret from the public discussion; (2) denotes that K P needs to be concealed from both Terminal 3 and the public discussion.
• K S and K P satisfy the uniformity conditions
where |K S | and |K P | correspond to the alphabet sizes of K S and K P , respectively. It must be mentioned that the above secrecy conditions (1) and (2) belong to weak security, and they can be converted to strong security by removing the factor 1 n [38] . Definition 2: For an −(SK-PK) key pair (K S , K P ), the key rate pair (R S , R P ) is called an achievable (SK, PK)rate pair if the following conditions are satisfied [25] , [26] .
The set of all achievable pairs (R S , R P ) is described as the (SK, PK)-capacity region. VOLUME 8, 2020 
III. KEY CAPACITY REGION FOR SK-PK GENERATION WITH A TRUSTED HELPER
In this section, the SK-PK capacity region for the considered model is characterized and shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1:
The key rate pair (R S , R P ) for SK-PK generation with a trusted helper satisfies the following inequalities, i.e., SK-PK capacity region.
where N 1 , N 2 and N 3 are given by
Proof: The proof of the SK-PK capacity region contains two parts: converse and achievability proofs. The converse proof is relegated to the Appendix A, and the achievability proof is shown in Section IV.
The SK-PK capacity region of the considered model is similar with the key capacity region over three-terminal model without helper (see Theorem 1 in [24] ) in form and also can be regarded as cut-set bounds. The main differences between the two regions are • In [24] , the upper bound of R P is due to one cut sepa- Similarly, for the sum rate 2R S + R P , there is one cut for three-terminal model, while our model has three cuts. It is clear that the key capacity region for our model has more cases than that for three-terminal model to design the achievable scheme due to different source distributions, and it is not sure whether the cut-set bound shown in Theorem 1 can be achieved for all cases in advance.
For the model considered, if only the K S -generation is considered, the SK-capacity region is R S ≤ min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } [16] , which implies that R S ≤ N 1 , R S ≤ N 2 and R S ≤ N 3 . The upper bound of R S is expressed as (8) due to the existence of (9) and (10) . It can be known that the SK-PK capacity region in Theorem 1 contains three cases: Case 1 with min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } = N 1 ; Case 2 with min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } = N 2 ; Case 3 with min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } = N 3 . The details of the three cases are as follows.
• Case 1: min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } = N 1 . By (9) and (10), R S + R P ≤ N 2 and R S + 1 2 R P ≤ N 3 hold, which means N 2 < N 3 is not exist. Thus, the case with N 1 ≤ N 3 ≤ N 2 is considered, which contains four sub-cases: Subcase 1-1: • Case 2: min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } = N 2 . Since the case with N 2 < N 3 ≤ N 1 is not possible, it is sufficient to consider the case with N 2 = N 3 ≤ N 1 , which reduces to Sub-case 1-4 of Case 1.
• Case 3: min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 } = N 3 . It is clear that the case with N 3 < N 2 ≤ N 1 reduces to Sub-case 1-3, and the case with N 3 = N 2 ≤ N 1 reduces to Sub-case 1-4, and the case with N 3 < N 1 ≤ N 2 reduces to Sub-case 1-3, and the case with N 3 = N 1 < N 2 reduces to Subcase 1-3, and the case with N 3 = N 1 = N 2 reduces to Sub-case 1-4. To recap, Case 1 covers Case 2 and Case 3. It is sufficient to consider Case 1 only in this paper. The achievable schemes that can achieve Points A, B, C, D and E are presented so that the entire hexagon O-A-B-C-D-E-O (as illustrated in Fig. 2 (a) ), the entire pentagon O-A-B-C-E-O (as illustrated in Fig. 2 (b) ) and the entire quadrilateral O-A-B-E-O (as illustrated in Fig. 2 (c)) can be achieved by time-sharing scheme, i.e., the SK-PK capacity region is achievable.
Remark 1: If K S -generation is considered only (i.e., Point E), the key capacity region becomes R S ≤ min{N 1 , N 2 , N 3 }. The problem reduces to generate K S with a trusted helper investigated in [16] , and the region can be achieved using ''omniscience'' scheme through public discussion. If K P -generation is considered only (i.e., Point A), the key capacity region becomes R P ≤ min{I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 4 |X 3 ), I (X 1 , X 4 ; X 2 |X 3 )}, the problem reduces to generate K P with a trusted helper and a non-trusted helper (Terminal 3), and this problem has been studied in [16] , and the region can be achieved utilizing ''omniscience'' scheme through public discussion. The achievable schemes for Points B, C and D are shown in Section IV-A, Section IV-B and Section IV-C, respectively.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
This section provides the achievability proof of Theorem 1. Based on the previous discussion, it suffices to verify that Points B, C and D in Fig. 2 (a) are achievable, which are proved in the following subsections, respectively.
A. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR POINT B
In this part, the achievable scheme for Point B is provided. The scheme is designed based on double random binning and joint typicality [32] , [39] . Define
which means the case of equivalence is neglected.
The rate coordinates of Point B are
which yields six cases as follows.
The key rate pair of Point B becomes
which yields
Case 4:
and then,
For better presentation, based on above six cases, define the following two joint cases • Joint Case 1: Merge Case 1 and Case 6 (the main idea of analyzing Case 3 and Case 5 together is similar, only changing the roles of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2. The details of it are omitted).
• Joint Case 2: Merge Case 1 and Case 4 (the main idea for gathering Case 2 and Case 5 is similar, only changing the roles of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2. The details of it are omitted). It suffices to verify that the above two joint cases of Point B are achievable.
1) ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR JOINT CASE 1
In this part, the achievable scheme of Joint Case 1 is provided. According to (17) and (33), the key rate pair of Point B becomes
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. Denote R 1 , R 2 , R 3 and R 4 as the rates of the information revealed by Terminals 1, 2, 3 and 4 over the public channel, respectively.
As in (34) , to achieve the key rate pair of Point B, Terminal 4 reveals information with rate R 4 = H (X 2 |X 4 ) and Terminal 3 reveals information with rate R 3 = max{H (X 3 |X 1 ), H (X 3 |X 2 , X 4 )} so that both of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 can recover X n 3 correctly with high probability. Then, Terminals 1, 2 and 3 can generate one K S at rate R S = H (X 3 ) − max{H (X 3 |X 1 ), H (X 3 |X 2 , X 4 )} = min{I (X 3 ; X 1 ), I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 )}. For given X n 3 , Terminal 1 reveals information with rate
. Since Terminal 3 is an untrusted helper for the generation of K P , X n 3 cannot be used as common randomness to generate keys, but Terminal 3 still can assist the recovery of source sequences through public discussion.
The achievable scheme contains five processes: codebook construction, encoding, decoding, key generation and analysis of key leakage rate (security). The details of them are shown as follows.
• Codebook Construction
At Terminal 1, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 1 ∈ X n 1 into a bin B 1 (f ), indexed by bin index f with f ∈ [1 : 2 nR 1 ], and then further assign sequences in each non-empty bin B 1 (f ) into 2 nR P sub-bins B 1 (f , α) indexed by sub-bin index α with α ∈ [1 : 2 nR P ]. The binning rates R 1 and R P are given by
Denote by f (x n 1 ) and α(x n 1 ) the bin index and sub-bin index of sequence x n 1 , respectively.
At Terminal 3, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 3 ∈ X n 3 into a bin B 3 (µ) indexed by bin index µ with µ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 3 ], and then further assign the sequences in each non-empty bin B 3 (µ) into 2 nR S sub-bins B 3 (µ, γ ) indexed by sub-bin index γ with γ ∈ [1 : 2 nR S ]. The binning rates R 3 and R S are given by
Denote by µ(x n 3 ) and γ (x n 3 ) the bin index and sub-bin index of sequence x n 3 , respectively. At Terminal 4, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 4 ∈ X n 4 into a bin B 4 (η), indexed by bin index η with η ∈ [1 : 2 nR 4 ]. The binning rate R 4 is given by
Denote by η(x n 4 ) the bin index of sequence x n 4 . The codebook assignment is revealed to all parties, i.e., Terminals 1, 2, 3, 4 and Eve. Fig. 3 for details of codebook construction and encoding for x n 1 s, and the rest codebooks are similar. • Decoding Upon receiving bin index µ, for given x n 1 , Terminal 1 tries to find a unique sequencex n 3 as the recovery of x n 3 such that
Upon receiving bin indexes f , µ and η, for given x n 2 , Terminal 2 tries to find the unique sequence tuple (x n 1 ,x n 3 ,x n 4 ) as the recovery of (x n 1 , x n 3 , x n 4 ) such thatx n
In order to ensure the decoding error can be arbitrarily small, based on Slepian-Wolf coding theorem introduced in [40] and [32, Theorem 10.1], the binning rates R 1 , R 3 and R 4 should satisfy the following Slepian-Wolf conditions
The decoding error satisfy 
. Given the sequence x n 1 (f , α), Terminal 1 reveals the bin index f over the public channel.
• Key Generation
. According to (41),
Analysis of Key Leakage Rate (Security)
Denote C as the whole codebooks. This part analyzes the security performance by analyzing the key leakage rates, i.e., (1) and (2), over C. Based on the above discussion, for the sake of convenience, define f := f (X n 1 ), µ := µ(X n 3 ), η := η(X n 4 ), γ := γ (X n 3 ) and α := α(X n 1 ). Notice that l = {f , µ, η},
where (a) is due to that γ and µ are determined by X n 3 . For K P ,
where (b) is due to that f and α are determined by X n 1 . Subsequently, the sufficient conditions to guarantee that the five terms in (43) and (44) can be arbitrary small are analyzed, which means the security of K S and K P can be ensure.
According to [25, Appendix A], it can be shown that if
for large enough n,
Similarly, if
Furthermore, according to [26, Appendix F] , it can be shown that if
Notice that I (X n 3 ; f , η|C) ≤ I (η, f , α; X n 3 |C), it is sufficient to analyze I (η, f , α; X n 3 |C). Similarly to [26, Appendix F], it can be obtained that if
Combining (46), (48), (50) and (52), it can be known that if the binning rates satisfy the sufficient conditions (45), (47), (49) and (51), the secrecy conditions 1 n I (K S ; l|C) and conditions (45) , (47), (49) and (51). More precisely, (49) holds due to (30) and the following assumption.
Otherwise, the Markov chain X 1 − X 3 − X 2 , X 4 holds so that R P = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 4 |X 3 ) = 0, and Point B will collapse into Point E, which is proved to be achievable in previous work. (51a) and (51c) hold due to (30) . (51c) holds due to the following relationship.
On the other hand, the binning rates satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions shown in (40) so that the decoding error is arbitrary small.
2) ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR JOINT CASE 2
In this part, the achievable scheme of Joint Case 2 is presented. Combining (17) and (27), the key rate coordinates of Point B becomes
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. To generate K S , Terminal 3 reveals information at rate R 3 = max{H (X 3 |X 1 ), H (X 3 , X 4 |X 2 ) − R 4 } so that both Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 can recover X n 3 correctly with high probability, and the K S with rate R S = min{I (X 3 ; X 1 ), I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 2 ) − I (X 1 ; X 4 |X 3 )} can be generated. For given X n 3 , one K P with rate R P = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 4 |X 3 ) can be shared between Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 if Terminal 1 reveals information with rate R 1 = H (X 1 |X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) to Terminal 2 so that Terminal 2 can recover X n 1 correctly with high probability.
The achievable scheme is the same as that for Joint Case 1, and the binning rates are given by
It is easy to verify that the binning rates above satisfy the sufficient conditions (45), (47), (49) and (51). In particular, (49) and (51a) hold due to the following assumptions.
Furthermore, it can be verified that the Slepian-Wolf conditions in (40) hold so that (41) and (42) are satisfied. In particular, R 1 + R 3 > H (X 1 , X 3 |X 2 , X 4 ) holds due to (15) . (16) .
B. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR POINT C
In this part, the achievable scheme for Point C is provided. The rate coordinates of Point C are R S = 2N 3 − N 2 and R P = 2N 2 − 2N 3 , which yields the following cases.
Case 1:
Moreover, (62) implies
The key rate pair of Point C becomes
Moreover, (67) implies
The key rate pair of Point C becomes (I (X 1 ; X 3 ), I (X 2 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 3 ) − I (X 1 ; X 3 )).
Case 3:
and
The key pair for Point C becomes (H (
Case 4: 2N 3 = H (X 1 ) + H (X 2 , X 4 ) + H (X 3 ) − H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) and N 2 = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ).
The key pair of Point C becomes (I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 ), I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) − I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 )). (78)
The key pair of Point C becomes
Since the cases with N 2 = I (X 2 ; X 1 , X 3 , X 4 ) are similar to the cases with N 2 = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ), and the idea of achievable schemes are also similar. The details are omitted.
1) ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR CASE 1 (CASE 2 IS SIMILAR)
In this part, the achievable scheme of Case 1 is presented (the idea of Case 2 is similar, only changing the roles of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2. The details are omitted).
The key rate pair of C for Case 1 is
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. Terminal 3 reveals information with rate R 3 = H (X 3 |X 2 ) so that Terminal 2 can recover X n 3 correctly with high probability. Terminals 2 and 3 jointly reveal information at the sum rate R 2 + R 3 = H (X 2 , X 3 |X 1 , X 4 ), and Terminal 4 reveals information with rate R 4 = H (X 4 |X 1 ) in order to let Terminal 1 can recover X n 2 and X n 3 correctly with high probability. The three terminals can generate one K S with rate R S = H (X 3 ) − H (X 3 |X 2 ) = I (X 3 ; X 2 ), and Terminals 1 and 2 can share one K P with rate R P = I (X 2 , X 3 ; X 1 , X 4 ) − I (X 3 ; X 2 ). The details of the achievable scheme are shown as follows.
• Codebook Construction At Terminal 2, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 2 ∈ X n 2 into a bin B 2 (g) indexed by bin index g with g ∈ [1 : 2 nR 2 ], and then further partition the sequences in each bin B 2 (g) into 2 nR P sub-bins B 2 (g, β) indexed by subbin index β with β ∈ [1 : 2 nR P ]. The binning rates R 2 and R P are given by
Denote g(x n 2 ) and β(x n 2 ) as the bin index and sub-bin index of sequence x n 2 , respectively. At Terminal 3, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 3 ∈ X n 3 into a bin B 3 (µ), indexed by bin index µ with µ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 3 ]. Then further partition the sequences in each bin B 3 (µ) into 2 nR S sub-bins B 3 (µ, γ ) indexed by subbin index γ with γ ∈ [1 : 2 nR S ]. The binning rates R 3 and R S are given by
Denote µ(x n 3 ) and γ (x n 3 ) as the bin index and sub-bin index of sequence x n 3 , respectively. At Terminal 4, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 4 ∈ X n 4 into a bin B 4 (η), indexed by bin index η with η ∈ [1 : 2 nR 4 ]. The binning rate R 4 is given by
Denote η(x n 4 ) as the bin index of sequence x n 4 . The codebook assignment is revealed to all parties.
• Encoding Given a sequence x n 2 ∈ B 2 (g, β), Terminal 2 reveals the bin index g = g(x n 2 ) to the public channel. Given a sequence x n 3 ∈ B 3 (µ, γ ), Terminal 3 reveals the bin index µ = µ(x n 3 ) to the public channel. Given a sequence x n 4 ∈ B 4 (η), Terminal 4 reveals the bin index η = η(x n 4 ) to the public channel. • Decoding For given x n 2 , after receiving µ, Terminal 2 tries to find a unique sequencex n 3 as the recovery of x n 3 such thatx n 3 ∈ B 3 (µ) and (x n 3 , x n 2 ) ∈ T (n) (X 2 X 3 ).
For given x n 1 , after receiving g, µ and η, Terminal 1 tries to find the unique sequence tuple (x n 2 ,x n 3 ,x n 4 ) as the recovery of (x n 2 , x n 3 , x n 4 ) such thatx n 2 ∈ B 2 (g),x n 3 ∈ B 3 (µ),x n 4 ∈ B 4 (η) and (x n 2 ,x n 3 ,x n 4 , x n 1 ) ∈ T (n) (X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 ).
To ensure the decoding error can be arbitrary small, i.e., Pr{X n 2 = X n 2 orX n 3 = X n 3 orX n 4 = X n 4 } < , (87a) Pr{X n 3 = X n 3 } < . (87b)
The binning rates R 2 , R 3 and R 4 should satisfy the following Slepian-Wolf conditions.
(88)
• Key Generation Terminal 1 setsK S = γ (X n 3 ) andK P = β(X n 2 ); Terminal 2 setsK S = γ (X n 3 ) and K P = β(X n 2 ); Terminal 3 sets K S = γ (X n 3 ). Based on (88), these keys also satisfy (42) .
• Analysis of Key Leakage Rate (Security)
The key leakage rates are analyzed in this part, i.e., (1) and (2), over the whole codebooks C. Based on above discussion, VOLUME 8, 2020 the public discussion is l = {g, µ, η}. Let g := g(X n 2 ), µ := µ(X n 3 ), η := η(X n 4 ), γ := γ (X n 3 ) and β := β(X n 2 ). I (K S ; l|C) = I (γ ; g, µ, η|C)
and I (K P ; X n 3 , l|C) = I (β; X n 3 , g, η|C) ≤ I (β; g|C) + I (g, β; X n 3 , η|C) ≤ I (β; g|C) + I (X n 2 ; η|C) + I (g, β, η; X n 3 |C). (90) The sufficient conditions are analyzed as follows so that each term in (89) and (90) can be arbitrary small, and the secrecy of the generated keys are guaranteed.
According to [25, Appendix A], it can be obtained that if
and if
According to [26, Appendix F] , it is easy to know that if
Since I (X n 3 ; g, η|C) ≤ I (g, β, η; X n 3 |C), it is sufficient to verify that I (g, β, η; X n 3 |C) is arbitrary small. Similarly to [26, Appendix F], if
It is easy to verify that the binning rates shown in (82)−(86) satisfy the sufficient conditions (91), (93), (95) and (97). In particular, (95) holds due to (63). (97b) holds due to (64). (97c) holds due to (61).
Furthermore, the binning rates also satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions in (88) so that (87) holds. Of particular, R 2 > H (X 2 |X 1 , X 3 , X 4 ) and R 2 + R 4 > H (X 2 , X 3 |X 1 , X 4 ) hold due to (62).
2) ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR CASE 3
The achievable scheme for Case 3 is provided in this part. The key pair of Point C of Case 3 is (H (X 4 |X 1 ) − H (X 4 |X 2 , X 3 ) + I (X 2 ; X 3 ),
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. Terminals 3 and 4 jointly reveal information at the sum rate R 3 + R 4 = H (X 3 , X 4 |X 2 ) so that Terminal 2 can recover X n 3 and X n 4 correctly with high probability. Then, Terminals 2 and 3 jointly reveal information with rate R 2 + R 3 = H (X 2 , X 3 |X 1 , X 4 ) and Terminal 4 reveals information with rate R 4 = H (X 4 |X 1 ) so that Terminal 1 can recover X n 2 and X n 3 correctly with high probability. Terminals 1, 2 and 3 can share one K S with rate R S = I (X 2 ; X 3 ) + H (X 4 |X 1 ) − H (X 4 |X 2 , X 3 ). To generate K P , Terminal 1 reveals information with rate R 1 = H (X 1 |X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) so that Terminal 2 can recover X n 1 correctly with high probability. One K P can be shared between Terminals 1 and 2 with rate R P = I (X 1 ;
The details of the achievable scheme are shown as follows.
• Codebook Construction
At Terminal 1, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 1 ∈ X n 1 into a bin B 1 (f ), indexed by bin index f with f ∈ [1 : 2 nR 1 ], and then further partition the sequences in each bin B 1 (f ) into 2 nR P sub-bins B 1 (f , α) indexed by subbin index α with α ∈ [1 : 2 nR P ]. The binning rates R 1 and R P are given by
Denote by f (x n 1 ) the bin index of sequence x n 1 , and denote by α(x n 1 ) the sub-bin index of sequence x n 1 . At Terminal 2, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 2 ∈ X n 2 into a bin B 2 (g), indexed by bin index g, where g ∈ [1 : 2 nR 2 ]. The binning rate R 2 is given by
Denote g(x n 2 ) as the bin index of sequence x n 2 . At Terminal 3, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 3 ∈ X n 3 into a bin B 3 (µ), indexed by bin index µ with µ ∈ [1 : 2 nR 3 ]. Then further partition the sequences in each bin B 3 (µ) into 2 nR S sub-bins B 3 (µ, γ ) indexed by subbin index γ with γ ∈ [1 : 2 nR S ]. The binning rates R 3 and R S are given by
Denote µ(x n 3 ) and γ (x n 3 ) the bin index and sub-bin index of sequence x n 3 , respectively.
At Terminal 4, randomly and independently assign each sequence x n 4 ∈ X n 4 into a bin B 4 (η), indexed by bin index η, where η ∈ [1 : 2 nR 4 ]. The binning rate R 4 is given by
Denote by η(x n 4 ) the bin index of sequence x n 4 . • Encoding Given a sequence x n 1 ∈ B 1 (f , α) , Terminal 1 reveals the bin index f = f (x n 1 ) to the public channel. Given a sequence x n 2 ∈ B 2 (g), Terminal 1 reveals the bin index g = g(x n 2 ) to the public channel. Given a sequence x n 3 ∈ B 3 (µ, γ ), Terminal 3 reveals the bin index µ = µ(x n 3 ) to the public channel. Given a sequence x n 4 ∈ B 4 (η), Terminal 4 reveals the bin index η = η(x n 4 ) to the public channel. • Decoding Upon receiving bin indexes g, µ and η, for given x n 1 , Terminal 1 tries to find the unique sequence tuple (x n 2 ,x n 3 ,x n 4 ) as the recovery of (x n 2 , x n 3 , x n 4 ) such thatx n 2 ∈ B 2 (g),x n 3 ∈ B 3 (µ),x n 4 ∈ B 4 (η) and (x n 2 ,x n 3 ,x n 4 , x n 1 ) ∈ T (n) (X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 ).
To guarantee the decoding error can be arbitrary small, i.e., Pr{X n 2 = X n 2 ,X n 3 = X n 3 ,X n 4 = X n 4 } < ,
Pr{X n 1 = X n 1 ,X n 3 = X n 3 ,X n 4 = X n 4 } < ,
the following Slepian-Wolf conditions should be satisfied
• Key Generation Terminal 1 setsK S = γ (X n 3 ) and K P = α(X n 1 ); Terminal 2 setsK S = γ (X n 3 ) andK P = α(X n 1 ); Terminal 3 sets K S = γ (X n 3 ). Based on (106), the generated keys satisfy (42) .
Analysis of Key Leakage Rate (Security):
This part analyzes the key leakage rates of K S and K P , i.e., (1) and (2), over the whole codebooks C. Based on above discussion, it is clear that l = {f , g, µ, η}. Let f := f (X n 1 ), g := g(X n 2 ), µ := µ(X n 3 ), η := η(X n 4 ), γ := γ (X n 3 ) and α := α(X n 1 ), it can be obtained that
The sufficient conditions that let each term in (107) and (108) can be arbitrary small are analyzed.
According to [25, Appendix A], if
Furthermore, according [26, Appendix F], if
Since I (X n 3 ; f , g, η) ≤ I (f , α, g, η; X n 3 ) holds, it is sufficient to verify that I (f , α, g, η; X n 3 ) is arbitrary small. Similarly to [26, Appendix F], it can be obtained that if
It is easy to verify that the binning rates shown in (99)−(104) satisfy the sufficient conditions (109), (111), (113) and (115). In particular, (111) holds due to (73). (113a) VOLUME 8, 2020 holds due to (75). (113c) holds due to (71). (115c) holds due to (72). (115a) holds due to the following relationship.
where (a) holds due to (75).
Moreover, (115b) holds due to the following relationship.
(115c) holds due to (72), and (115d) holds due to the following relationship.
Furthermore, the binning rates also satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions in (106) if R 4 > H (X 4 |X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ), which contradicts with (73). In addition, R 1 + R 4 > H (X 1 , X 4 |X 2 , X 3 ) holds due to (73), and R 2 + R 4 > H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 , X 3 ) holds due to (75).
3) ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR CASE 4 (CASE 5 IS SIMILAR)
In this part, the achievable scheme for Case 4 is presented (the idea of that for Case 5 is similar, and the details are omitted).
The key rate pair of Point C for Case 4 is (I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 ), I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) − I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 )).
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. Terminal 3 reveals information with rate R 3 = H (X 3 |X 2 , X 4 ) and Terminal 4 reveals information with rate R 4 = H (X 4 |X 2 ) in order to let Terminal 2 can recover X n 3 correctly with high probability. Then, Terminals 2, 3 and 4 jointly reveal information with the sum rate R 2 + R 3 + R 4 = H (X 2 , X 3 , X 4 |X 1 ) so that Terminal 1 can recover X n 2 , X n 3 and X n 4 correctly with high probability. Thus, Terminals 1, 2 and 3 can share one K S with rate R S = H (X 3 ) − H (X 3 |X 2 , X 4 ) = I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 ). Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 can share one K P with rate R P = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) − I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 ).
The achievable scheme is the same as that of Case 1 for Point C, and the binning rates are given by
The binning rates above satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions in (88) if R 4 > H (X 4 |X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ). Otherwise, the Markov chain X 4 − X 2 − X 1 , X 3 holds, and the rate pair can be achieved without the help of Terminal 4. In addition, R 2 > H (X 2 |X 1 , X 3 , X 4 ) holds due to (75), and R 2 + R 3 > H (X 2 , X 3 |X 1 , X 4 ) holds due to (77), and R 2 + R 4 > H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 , X 3 ) holds due to (74).
It can be verified that the binning rates above satisfy the sufficient conditions (91), (93), (95) and (97). In particular, (97b) holds due to (76).
The achievable scheme of Case 5 is similar to that of Case 4, only changing the binning rate settings of R 3 and R S as
C. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR POINT D
In this part, the achievable scheme for Point D is provided. The rate coordinates of Point D are R S = N 1 and R P = 2N 3 − 2N 1 , which yield two cases as follows.
Case 1: I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 ) < I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ), which implies
which implies
and it can be obtained that 2N 3 
The key rate pair of Point D becomes (I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 ), I (X 1 ; X 2 ) − I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 )). (125)
The following relationship is satisfied, which will be used later.
The key rate pair of Point D becomes (I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ),
1) ACHIEVABLE SCHEME FOR CASE 1
In this part, the achievable scheme for Case 1 is provided, and the key pair of Point D is (I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 ), I (X 1 ; X 2 ) − I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 )). (139)
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. To share one K S , Terminal 3 and Terminal 4 jointly reveal information with the sum rate R 3 + R 4 = H (X 3 , X 4 |X 1 , X 2 ), and Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 will send information to help each other to recover X n 3 and X n 4 , i.e., Terminal 1 reveals information with rate R 1 = H (X 1 |X 2 ) to Terminal 2 so that Terminal 2 can recover X n 1 correctly with high probability, and Terminal 2 reveals information with rate R 2 = H (X 2 |X 1 ) to Terminal 1 so that Terminal 1 can recover X n 2 correctly with high probability. Thus, one K S with rate R S = I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 ) and one K P with rate R P = I (X 1 ; X 2 ) − I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 ) can be generated.
The achievable scheme for this case is the same as that for Case 3 of Point C, and the binning rates are given by
The binning rates above satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions in (106) if R 4 > H (X 4 |X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) holds. Otherwise, the Markov chain X 4 − X 3 − X 1 , X 2 holds, and the key rate pair can be achieved without Terminal 4. In particular, R 3 > H (X 3 |X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ) holds due to (122), and R 1 + R 3 > H (X 1 , X 3 |X 2 , X 4 ) holds due to (124), and R 2 + R 3 > H (X 2 , X 3 |X 1 , X 4 ) holds due to (123).
Moreover, it is easy to verify that the binning rates above satisfy the sufficient conditions (109), (111), (113) and (115). More precisely, (113c) holds due to (122), and (115b) holds due to (126). In this part, the achievable scheme for Sub-case 2-2 is provided (the idea of that for Sub-case 2-1 is similar, only changing the roles of Terminal 1 and Terminal 2. The details are omitted). The key rate pair of Point D is (I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ), I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 4 ) − I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 )).
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. Terminal 2 and Terminal 4 jointly reveal information with the sum rate R 2 + R 4 = H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 ), and Terminal 3 reveals information with rate R 3 = H (X 3 |X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ) in order to let Terminal 1 to recover X n 3 correctly with high probability. Then, Terminal 1 reveals information with rate R 1 = H (X 1 |X 2 , X 4 ) and Terminal 4 reveals information with rate R 4 = H (X 4 |X 2 ) so that Terminal 2 can recover X n 1 correctly with high probability. Terminal 2 also can recover X n 3 due to the information with rate R 3 = H (X 3 |X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ). Thus, Terminals 1, 2 and 3 can share one K S with rate R S = H (X 3 ) − H (X 3 |X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ) = I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ). Terminals 1 and Terminal 2 can share one K P with rate R P = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 4 ) − I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ).
The achievable scheme of Sub-case 2-2 is as the same as that for Case 3 of Point C, and the binning rates are given by
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The binning rates above satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions in (106) if H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 ) > H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 , X 3 ). Otherwise, the Markov chain X 2 , X 4 − X 1 − X 3 holds.
It is easy to verify that the binning rates above satisfy the sufficient conditions (109), (111), (113) and (115). In particular, (115b) holds due to the following relationship.
In this part, the achievable scheme of Sub-case 2-3 for Case 2 is provided. The rate coordinates of Point D is
The main idea of the achievable scheme is shown as follows. Terminals 1 and 4 jointly reveal information at the sum rate R 1 + R 4 = H (X 1 , X 4 |X 2 ) and Terminals 2 and 4 reveal information at the sum rate R 2 + R 4 = H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 ) so that both Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 can recover X n 3 correctly if Terminal 3 reveals information at rate R 3 = H (X 3 |X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ). The key rate of K S can be as large as R S = H (X 3 ) − H (X 3 |X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ) = I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ). Terminal 2 also can recover X n 1 correctly due to the public transmission R 1 + R 4 = H (X 1 , X 4 |X 2 ). Thus, the key rate of K P can be as large as R P = I (X 1 ;
The achievable scheme is as same as that for Case 3 of Point C, and the binning rates are given by
The binning rates above satisfy the Slepian-Wolf conditions (106) if R 4 > H (X 4 |X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) and H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 ) > H (X 2 , X 4 |X 1 , X 3 ). Otherwise, the Markov chains X 4 − X 3 − X 1 , X 2 and X 2 , X 4 − X 1 − X 3 hold. The first Markov chain contradicts (127).
Furthermore, it can be verified that the binning rates above satisfy the sufficient conditions (109), (111), (113) and (115). In particular, (115b) holds due to the following relationship.
This completes the achievability proof of Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has investigated the problem of simultaneously generating SK and PK over three terminals with a trusted helper, and an eavesdropper has access to the public discussion completely. The key capacity region for the model considered was characterized, and the achievable scheme that can achieve the region was presented. The security performance of the two generated keys was analyzed by analyzing key leakage rates. The model considered in this paper is a basic model, which can be mapped to a variety of practical scenarios, such as IoT [41] , vehicle network [42] , D2D network [43] , etc.
For future work, the general DMS model considered in this paper can be extended to compound source model. The previous studies [11] and [44] considered the problem of single key generation using compound sources. On the other hand, the multi-key generation over source model using channel coding scheme can be considered. The previous study [45] investigated point-to-point key generation using polar coding scheme.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Before going further, two results in [16] are reviewed.
Theorem 2 (Example 4 in [16] ): Given a set of terminals A ⊂ V and a partition B = (B 1 , . . . , B P ) of V, each intersecting A, the upper bound of SK-capacity, generated by A with the remaining terminals as helpers, is given by
Theorem 3 (Theorem 2 of [16] ): The SK capacity C SK (A|A c ) for a given set of terminals A ⊂ V, with the remaining terminals as the untrusted helpers, is given by
Similarly to the analysis of Example 4 in [16] , 
Substituting (161) into (159),
Based on above discussion, the SK-capacity region with partial trusted helpers (part of the helpers can be trusted, and the other cannot be trusted) can be obtained. Denote A SK as the set of terminals who want to share SKs. Denote A T and A NT as the set of trusted helpers and non-trusted helpers, respectively.
Theorem 4: Given V = {A SK , A T , A NT }, the SKcapacity C SK (A SK , A T |A NT ) for A SK is given by
where B = {B i , . . . , B P } is the partition of A = {A SK , A T }, each intersecting A SK .
The converse proof of Theorem 1 is shown as follows.
• The upper bound of R P . Since A SK = {1, 2}, A T = {4} and A NT = {3} for K P -generation, according to Theorem 4, = n[H (X 1 ) + H (X 2 ) + H (X 3 , X 4 ) − H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 )] + 2n( + 2 n ).
Thus, 2R S + R P ≤ H (X 1 ) + H (X 2 ) + H (X 3 , X 4 )
− H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) + 2( + 2 n + δ). (164)
By similar idea, 2R S + R P ≤ H (X 1 , X 4 ) + H (X 2 ) + H (X 3 )
− H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) + 2( + 2 n + δ), (165) and 2R S + R P ≤ H (X 1 ) + H (X 2 , X 4 ) + H (X 3 )
− H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) + 2( + 2 n + δ). (166)
Combining (164) (165) and (166), the upper bound of 2R S + R P can be obtained.
This completes the converse proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B NON-EXISTENCE PROOF OF SUB-CASE 1-2
The proof of non-existence of Sub-case 1-2 with N 1 < N 2 = N 3 is shown as follows. According to Theorem 1, the proof contains four cases. Case 1: If N 2 = I (X 1 , X 4 ; X 2 , X 3 ), then N 3 = 1 2 [H (X 1 , X 4 ) + H (X 2 ) + H (X 3 ) − H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 )]. It can be obtained that N 2 = N 3 ⇒ I (X 1 , X 4 ; X 2 , X 3 ) = I (X 2 ; X 3 ) < N 1 .
Case 2:
If N 2 = I (X 2 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 3 ), then N 3 = 1 2 [H (X 1 ) + H (X 2 , X 4 ) + H (X 3 ) − H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 )], which can obtain N 2 = N 3 ⇒ I (X 2 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 3 ) = I (X 1 ; X 3 ) < N 1 .
Case 3:
If N 2 = min{I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 )
x , I (X 2 ; X 1 , X 3 , X 4 ) y } and N 1 = I (X 3 , X 4 ; X 1 , X 2 ), which implies
It can be obtained that N 2 = N 3 ⇒ I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) = I (X 2 ; X 3 , X 4 ) < N 1 , if x < y, I (X 2 ; X 1 , X 3 , X 4 ) = I (X 1 ; X 3 , X 4 ) < N 1 , if x > y.
Case 4:
If N 2 = min{I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ), I (X 2 ; X 1 , X 3 , X 4 )} and N 1 = I (X 3 ; X 1 , X 2 , X 4 ), which implies
H (X 1 , X 4 )+H (X 2 )+H (X 3 )−H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ), H (X 1 )+H (X 2 , X 4 )+H (X 3 )−H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ), H (X 1 )+H (X 2 )+H (X 3 , X 4 )−H (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 )
which contains the following sub-cases.
Sub-case 4-1: N 2 = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) and N 3 = 
Sub-case 4-2: N 2 = I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) and N 3 = 1 2 min H (X 1 )+H (X 2 ,X 4 )+H (X 3 )−H (X 1 ,X 2 ,X 3 ,X 4 ), H (X 1 )+H (X 2 )+H (X 3 ,X 4 )−H (X 1 ,X 2 ,X 3 ,X 4 ) , which imply N 2 = N 3 ⇒ I (X 1 ; X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) = min{I (X 3 ; X 2 , X 4 ), I (X 2 ; X 3 , X 4 )} < N 1 .
The idea of the case with N 2 = I (X 2 ; X 1 , X 3 , X 4 ) is similar, and the details are omitted.
To summary, the relationship N 2 = N 3 < N 1 always holds for different source distributions.
This completes the proof of non-existence of Sub-case 1-2.
